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NO. 13 MARCH 2020 Introduction 
The Brexit Revolution 
New Political Conditions Change the Dynamics of the Next Phase 
of EU-UK Negotiations 
Nicolai von Ondarza 
Following the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union (EU), the 
Brexit negotiations are entering the decisive next phase: In a transition period of now 
only 10 months, the future relationship between the EU and the United Kingdom with 
regard to economic, internal security, and foreign policy as well as an overall institu-
tional framework must be negotiated. But the signs point to confrontation. The main 
aim of the domestically strengthened British government is absolute dissociation 
from the EU; the list with potential points of conflict with the Union’s negotiation 
objectives is long. Together, the negotiators must find a new model of cooperation 
between partnership and competition. 
 
It took the United Kingdom three and a half 
years after the referendum to leave the EU 
on 31 January 2020. In tough negotiations 
with many threats, political chaos, and con-
fusion, especially in London, political deci-
sion-makers and negotiators succeeded in 
bringing about an orderly Brexit. 
However, the withdrawal agreement that 
has now entered into force “only” clarifies 
the issues of divorce: These include 1) all 
the transition issues that need to be dealt 
with in such a complex unbundling pro-
cess, such as the handling of ongoing court 
cases, 2) the protection of the rights of EU 
citizens in the United Kingdom and vice 
versa, 3) the United Kingdom’s obligations 
to the EU budget, and 4) special geographi-
cal arrangements for Gibraltar, UK bases in 
Cyprus, and, in particular, Northern Ire-
land. Finally, the withdrawal agreement 
creates common institutions and sets the 
transition phase until the end of 2020. Dur-
ing this transition period, EU law will con-
tinue to be applied in the United Kingdom 
(including full access to the Internal Market 
and Customs Union), and the United King-
dom will continue to pay into the EU bud-
get as before, but it has now left all EU in-
stitutions. 
The Clock Is Ticking Even Faster 
Now the core questions of Brexit must be 
answered: the future relationship of the 
United Kingdom with the EU in trade, eco-
nomic cooperation, internal security, for-
eign and security policy, and many other 
areas. The time frame for these negotiations 
is extremely tight. According to the with-
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drawal agreement, the transition period 
ends on 31 December 2020, within which 
period a new trade agreement between the 
EU and the United Kingdom is to be con-
cluded, at the very least. Otherwise, the 
United Kingdom will leave the EU’s single 
market and customs union without a fol-
low-up agreement. 
This is reminiscent of previous Brexit 
negotiations, which also had to take place 
within a certain period of time; otherwise, a 
no-deal Brexit would have been imminent. 
However, the current situation is different. 
For one, time is pressing, even more than 
before. Article 50 of the Treaty on European 
Union (TEU) sets a deadline of two years to 
negotiate a withdrawal agreement. Even 
these two years were not enough for the 
EU-27 and the United Kingdom to agree on 
the four “aspects of divorce”, partly because 
of the political infighting in London. The 
deadline therefore had to be extended a 
total of three times in order to avoid a 
no-deal Brexit. The transition period of 11 
months is considerably shorter. Moreover, 
negotiations on the future relationship 
touch upon many more policy areas. Just 
looking at trade, the average duration of 
recent negotiations for large EU trade agree-
ments, such as those with Canada or Japan, 
has been just over five years. 
The political dynamic of the negotiations 
are also different because, although the 
impact of a “no trade deal Brexit” is still 
regarded as significant, it is expected to be 
less impactful than a “no deal Brexit” would 
have been. After all, the United Kingdom 
has left the EU in an orderly fashion, and 
key issues of the transition have been re-
solved. Now, in the event of a failure to 
reach an agreement, “only” a reversion to 
the rules of the World Trade Organisation 
would remain, leading to the reintroduce-
tion of customs duties, border controls, and 
all the economic consequences associated 
with them. Since the EU as a whole is much 
more important for the United Kingdom 
(about 49 per cent of British trade in goods) 
than vice versa (about 15 per cent of EU-27 
trade in goods), the pressure on London to 
reach an agreement is, rationally speaking, 
much greater. However, the political in-
hibitions in London about the risk of failure 
of negotiations are perceptibly lower than 
before the no-deal Brexit, which was feared 
to lead to more serious chaos. For parts of 
the British government, a no-trade-deal 
Brexit, now referred to by UK Prime Minis-
ter Boris Johnson as the “Australia” model, 
is at least an acceptable, if not preferred, 
outcome of the negotiations. 
In addition, the conditions for extending 
the transition period are much more diffi-
cult. The negotiations under Article 50 TEU 
could be extended several times by unani-
mous vote, and such a decision could have 
literally been taken up to the very last 
minute before the deadline. The transition 
period, on the other hand, can only be ex-
tended once, at most until the end of 2022. 
More importantly, a decision on an exten-
sion under Article 132 of the withdrawal 
agreement must be taken by 30 June 2020. 
If it becomes apparent in autumn 2020 that 
no agreement on a trade agreement can be 
reached for the time being or that ratifica-
tion is faltering, it will no longer be legally 
possible to extend the deadline. Finally, 
Johnson has categorically ruled out a re-
quest for an extension of the transition 
phase by the United Kingdom and has had 
this enshrined in UK law. Although John-
son could reverse course and call upon 
Parliament to change the law, the political 
costs would be high for Johnson, despite his 
now comfortable majority. At present, there 
is no indication that the Johnson govern-
ment is willing to change course on its main 
aim to fully leave all EU rules behind on 
January 2021, although opposition politi-
cians are starting to call for an extension of 
transition due to the coronavirus crisis. 
The Domestic Victory of the 
Brexiteers 
The biggest change compared to the pre-
vious Brexit negotiations is the almost com-
plete domestic political triumph of the 
Brexiteers under Prime Minister Johnson. 
After losing the general elections of 2017, 
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following which Theresa May could only 
govern with the help of the Northern Ire-
land Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the 
British government was without a majority 
of its own during one of its most complex 
foreign policy negotiations. The conse-
quences are well-known: Theresa May lost 
more votes in the House of Commons than 
her five predecessors combined; Johnson, 
too, was only able to win a few procedural 
votes until the new elections in December 
2019. Before that, there was only a majority 
in the House of Commons against a no deal 
Brexit, but not one in favour of any of the 
Brexit options or a second referendum. 
Since the election victory of Johnson and 
his Conservative Party, however, the politi-
cal conditions have been reversed. With his 
promise to “Get Brexit Done” and by unit-
ing pro-Brexit voters behind his party, John-
son has achieved a triple success. Firstly, 
the Tories have now regained an absolute 
majority with 365 of 650 Members of Parlia-
ment (MPs). Johnson is no longer dependent 
on the DUP as a majority provider, while 
individual groups within the Tory parlia-
mentary party can no longer cost him the 
majority. In addition, when the withdrawal 
agreement was ratified, he succeeded in 
ensuring that Parliament had less say in the 
agreement(s) on the future relationship than 
it has had on the withdrawal agreement. 
Secondly, with his election victory, John-
son has ended the “civil war” in the Con-
servative Party over European politics that 
has lasted for more than 30 years. Prior to 
the 2016 referendum, the majority of con-
servative MPs were in favour of staying in 
the EU. This has now completely changed. 
By the end of 2019, there were only 22 Tory 
MPs who were prepared to vote in favour of 
the anti-no-deal legislation, against the 
instruction of party leadership. Johnson’s 
decision to expel them from the parliamen-
tary party cost him his majority in the 
autumn of 2019. However, none of these 
MPs made it back into the House of Com-
mons in the new elections, whether they 
ran as independent candidates or for the 
Liberal Democrats. The signal to the party 
is unmistakable – there will be no more 
rebellion against Brexit policy from within 
the Tory party. 
Thirdly, Johnson has a free hand in 
domestic politics, at least temporarily. The 
British political system gives a prime minis-
ter with an absolute majority a high degree 
of power, in particular when compared to 
federal systems, such as in Germany. In 
addition, both the Labour Party (reduced to 
202 MPs) and the Liberal Democrats (11 MPs) 
have lost their party leaders. The internal 
processes to determine the succession will 
run until April (Labour) or even July (Liberal 
Democrats). Shaken to their core by their 
respective electoral defeats, neither party is 
in a position to present an effective opposi-
tion. In addition, the civil society “Remain” 
movement had, until January 2020, con-
centrated solely on a second referendum, 
mobilising large crowds for impressive 
demonstrations across the country. How-
ever, now that the United Kingdom has left 
the EU, the previous “people’s vote” cam-
paign lacks a political strategy, partly be-
cause the demand for a return to the EU 
can be regarded as unrealistic for years to 
come. This means that the British govern-
ment can now pursue its own Brexit policy 
without almost any domestic political 
barriers. 
Setting Itself Up for 
Confrontation 
With this new power, the British govern-
ment is gearing up for a confrontation with 
the EU. To this end, Johnson, unlike Theresa 
May, has from the beginning relied on de-
clared Brexit supporters in his cabinet. All 
the members of the government are now 
proven Brexiteers, many of whom cam-
paigned for withdrawal from the EU even 
before the 2016 referendum. In particular, 
the UK Treasury, which traditionally tends 
to be pro-single market, is being geared to 
support a hard Brexit. In contrast to his 
predecessors, the new Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Rishi Sunak, emphasises the 
advantages of a clear break from the EU. 
Instead of resistance from the cabinet, the 
central ministerial posts are now occupied 
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by politicians who reject any deeper insti-
tutionalised cooperation with the EU. The 
Brexit revolutionaries of the “Vote Leave” 
campaign have thus taken control of the 
Conservative Party, the government, and 
Parliament. 
Under these conditions, a strategy for 
post-Brexit relations is already emerging, 
which is primarily based on confrontation 
and complete separation from the EU. The 
prevailing narrative among Brexit support-
ers is that, in the first phase of Brexit nego-
tiations, the United Kingdom was, in their 
view, humiliated because the British gov-
ernment did not want to, or could not, cred-
ibly threaten to break off the negotiations. 
In line with this basic understanding, the 
British government has already threatened 
to break off the negotiations if no progress 
in their favour is apparent by June 2020. 
Following the Brexit vote, a wide range 
of potential models of cooperation were 
discussed: from the Norway/European Eco-
nomic Area (EEA) model with extensive 
access to the internal market, to a customs 
union, all the way to a traditional free trade 
agreement. Theresa May wanted to nego-
tiate an interim solution and at least main-
tain the frictionless movement of goods – 
and was prepared to accept EU standards 
for this. Among others, the then UK Foreign 
Minister Boris Johnson resigned in protest 
because, in his view, a Brexit without regu-
latory freedom and a trade policy of its own 
was not a proper Brexit. 
In this sense, his government has aban-
doned the goal of maintaining frictionless 
trade in goods and emphasises the need for 
regulatory freedom. It wants a standard 
trade agreement and rejects any obligation 
to maintain or align with EU standards. 
British companies are already being pre-
pared for the reintroduction of border con-
trols with the EU from 2021 onwards, even 
if a trade agreement is concluded. 
Regional Tensions 
Aside from economic constraints, there is 
one potentially limiting factor on the Brit-
ish government’s hard Brexit policy: Brexit 
fuelled regional tensions within the United 
Kingdom. In January 2020, the regional 
parliaments of three of the four nations of 
the United Kingdom – Wales, Scotland, 
Northern Ireland, the latter even unani-
mously – voted against the withdrawal 
agreement. The British government, how-
ever, was legally able – and politically 
willing – to override them. The regional 
governments and parliaments also have no 
veto position in the negotiations on the 
future relationship. 
Nevertheless, the British government will 
have to weigh up a political trade-off. North-
ern Ireland deserves special attention: After 
three years of deadlock, power-sharing has 
been restored, and a new Northern Ireland 
Executive was able to be formed in early 
2020. However, the peace process remains 
fragile, and the surprise election success of 
Sinn Féin in the Republic of Ireland has put 
the issue of Irish reunification on the agen-
da once again. Crucially, due to the North-
ern Ireland Protocol in the Withdrawal 
Agreement, Northern Ireland will continue 
to apply EU rules on goods, VAT, and state 
aid, for example. These measures were 
agreed to keep the border between North-
ern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland 
open. In consequence, however, the more 
that the United Kingdom withdraws from 
the single market of the EU, the more bor-
der controls will become necessary between 
Northern Ireland and the rest of the United 
Kingdom. In the case of a very hard Brexit, 
the British government would have to 
accept that this will boost demands for a 
“border poll” in Northern Ireland. 
At the same time, the conflict between 
the Scottish Executive and the Johnson 
administration is one of the UK’s central 
political battles of 2020. Moving towards a 
hard Brexit, contrary to the 62 per cent of 
Scots who voted “Remain”, has significantly 
strengthened the independence movement. 
Brexit has now become a key argument for 
the proponents of Scottish independence. 
In several polls at the beginning of 2020, a 
(slim) majority of Scots were in favour of 
independence. In January 2020, the Scottish 
Parliament launched legislation for a second 
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independence referendum. Legally, Scot-
land can only organise a binding referen-
dum with the consent of the British Parlia-
ment – something that the Conservatives 
have already rejected. However, this block-
ade attitude will be politically difficult to 
sustain if the Scottish National Party wins 
the Scottish elections in 2021. In order to 
keep the United Kingdom together, the 
British government should actually take 
Northern Ireland and Scotland into con-
sideration – but so far it has tended to be 
confrontational, especially with regard to 
Scotland. 
Main Areas of Conflict 
At every stage of the Brexit negotiations to 
date, the EU and the British government 
have emphasised their common desire to 
negotiate an “ambitious, broad and deep 
partnership”. But now at the beginning of 
the transition period, the signs are pointing 
to confrontation. Both sides had previously 
agreed on the outlines of future relations 
in the (non-binding) Political Declaration, 
which was adopted in parallel with the 
withdrawal agreement. The original Politi-
cal Declaration was agreed in 2018, but 
Johnson also renegotiated parts of it with 
the EU-27 and explicitly consented to its 
content. Since then, however, both sides 
have set their respective negotiation aims, 
revealing many areas of conflict. 
Difficult Trade Negotiations 
The first area is economic partnership. At 
its core, the EU remains an economic com-
munity, and 47 years of economic integra-
tion have contributed to close economic ties 
with the United Kingdom. The basic aim is 
to regulate market access in all sectors that 
have been covered by EU membership so 
far – goods, capital, financial and other 
services, data, public procurement rules, 
mobility of persons, transport, aviation, 
energy, fisheries, and more. 
In principle, both sides are interested in 
a standard trade agreement to preserve 
their respective autonomy. However, they 
have fundamentally different ideas about 
this: The EU is striving to include provisions 
on fair competition (level playing field) in a 
standard free trade agreement. Not only are 
existing EU standards to be protected, but a 
procedure for aligning to new EU standards 
is also to be created in particularly critical 
areas. This goes beyond the provisions of 
previous EU trade agreements. The EU-27 
justify this with the depth of market access 
(zero tariffs, zero quotas), the economic 
weight of the United Kingdom, and its geo-
graphical proximity. 
The British government, on the other 
hand, wants a free trade agreement based 
on the model of the Comprehensive Eco-
nomic and Trade Agreement (CETA) be-
tween the EU and Canada; it also rejects 
any obligation to maintain, or even dy-
namically align to, EU standards. Neverthe-
less, it wants (unlike Canada) zero tariffs 
without exceptions and, with cooperation 
from regulatory authorities, to keep non-
tariff barriers to trade as low as possible. 
Other lines of economic conflict lie in 
fisheries policy and financial services. For 
the former, the EU mandate aims to main-
tain access to British territorial waters and 
retain fishing quotas. In contrast, Brexit 
supporters are keen to regain control of 
their own fisheries policy. The Johnson 
government therefore wants to negotiate a 
separate bilateral agreement on fisheries 
with the EU, allowing for annual flexibility 
as an “independent coastal state”, similar to 
Norway, and to determine better conditions 
for its own fishermen. According to the 
Political Declaration, which provides for an 
agreement on fisheries by June 2020, the 
EU wants to make this a litmus test of 
Britain’s willingness to compromise. 
The situation is to some extent reversed 
with regard to access to financial market 
services. The British government has drop-
ped the goal of maintaining full access to 
the EU single market for financial service 
providers from London. Nevertheless, it 
wants the EU to create a permanent equiva-
lence for financial services in order to se-
cure long-term access to the EU market for 
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the City of London. The EU-27, however, 
insist that equivalence decisions are uni-
lateral, and that it must be able to reverse 
them at any time in order to protect the EU 
financial market in case of doubt. In the 
Political Declaration, the Union committed 
itself with “best endeavour” to complete the 
equivalence assessment by June 2020. 
Internal Security 
The second area is cooperation on justice, 
home affairs, and migration policy. The 
critical issues here are to develop (more 
limited) instruments for data exchange, 
operational cooperation between law en-
forcement authorities, judicial cooperation 
in criminal matters, and cooperation in the 
fight against organised crime and terrorism. 
As an EU member, the United Kingdom has 
occupied a paradoxical position in this 
policy area. On the one hand, in developing 
EU justice and home affairs policy, it has 
negotiated for itself extensive opt-out rights 
and was not a member of the Schengen 
Area; on the other hand, it has participated 
in a large part of the measures of justice 
and home affairs policy by way of opt-in. In 
practice, the United Kingdom therefore has 
often been a driving force when it comes to 
closer justice and home affairs cooperation 
within the EU. 
According to the Political Declaration, 
both sides want “close, mutual and recipro-
cal” cooperation in this field. The potential 
for conflict concerns the balance between 
access to EU databases and the binding 
effect of standards under European law, for 
example in data protection. London also 
wants “pragmatic” cooperation, but only as 
long as it is ensured that the United King-
dom is not bound by EU law and is not 
subject to the jurisdiction of the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ). In contrast, the EU-27 
want to make the exchange of data depen-
dent on the extent to which the United 
Kingdom undertakes efforts to comply with 
European data protection standards. The EU 
also makes cooperation on internal security 
conditional on the United Kingdom remain-
ing a member of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR), which the British 
government, like all legal obligations, re-
jects, although the United Kingdom itself is 
a founding member of the ECHR. 
Foreign and Security Policy 
A third important area of negotiation is 
cooperation on foreign policy, security, and 
defence. Here the need to find a new way of 
working together is even more pressing: 
The greatest value of EU foreign and secu-
rity policy is in the permanent coordination 
of EU member states. Although EU law 
continues to apply in the United Kingdom 
during the transition, the United Kingdom 
has already left the EU institutions. It no 
longer participates in EU coordination, 
neither in Brussels nor in international 
organisations such as the United Nations or 
in third countries. The United Kingdom is 
therefore no longer sitting at the table – to 
the detriment of both sides – when coordi-
nating in the EU format on how to deal 
with Russia, Syria, Turkey, China, Libya, 
Iran, and the Western Balkans. 
According to the Political Declaration, 
Brussels and London aim for “ambitious, 
close and lasting cooperation”, which in-
cludes the establishment of structured con-
sultation formats, consultations on sanc-
tions, the possibility of British participation 
in EU operations, the development of de-
fence capabilities, and the exchange of 
intelligence information. However, London 
has already scaled back its ambitions in this 
regard and wants to do without institution-
alised foreign and security policy coopera-
tion with the EU altogether. Accordingly, 
the British government will try to switch to 
bilateral and multilateral cooperation, in 
particular with Paris, Berlin, and Warsaw, 
as well as with NATO. This is also a chal-
lenge for Germany, which will have to 
weigh its interest in keeping the United 
Kingdom aligned with European foreign 
and security policy, for example on Iran, 
with its interest in strengthening the EU as 
a foreign policy actor. 
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Essential Governance Issues 
Fourthly, the EU and the United Kingdom 
will need to negotiate new governance 
structures, that is, an institutional frame-
work that brings together the various areas 
of cooperation. The EU is therefore aiming 
for an Association Agreement that covers as 
much of the EU-UK cooperation as possible. 
According to the Political Declaration, this 
institutional framework should include a 
standard dialogue format at all levels, a 
parliamentary exchange format, and a dis-
pute settlement procedure. The latter is par-
ticularly important in order to enforce 
possible agreements on a level playing field. 
In its own mandate, however, the United 
Kingdom aims for a series of agreements 
that are not directly connected by a joint 
governance framework. 
The withdrawal agreement already pro-
vides for a dispute settlement procedure. If 
one of the parties fails to comply with its 
obligations, an arbitration panel may be 
convened. In case of disputes relating to EU 
law, the ECJ must be consulted and its rul-
ings are then binding for the arbitration 
panel. In the event of continued breaches 
of obligations under the withdrawal agree-
ment, the EU – or the United Kingdom, for 
that matter – may, after no solution is 
reached over a six-month period, suspend 
all rights under the withdrawal agreement, 
or even any other agreement between the 
two partners. The EU wants to anchor a 
comparable “guillotine clause” for all areas 
of the future agreement, including the 
competence of the ECJ in matters relating 
to Union law. In addition, the EU mandate 
provides that the parties to the contract 
may impose sanctions immediately after a 
violation and not at the end of a lengthy 
arbitration procedure. This would enable 
the EU to sanction British violations of EU 
standards or agreements on fisheries policy 
directly, or at least to signal the use of 
sanctions. 
Due to their cross-cutting nature, institu-
tional issues are likely to be the most diffi-
cult part of the negotiations. London strictly 
rejects any jurisdiction of the ECJ over Brit-
ish law; rather, it wants to orientate itself 
on the dispute settlement provisions of 
CETA. The ECJ has no role to play in this, 
and the possibilities for sanctions are much 
more limited. In addition, instead of an 
overarching association agreement, the Brit-
ish government wants a series of individual 
contracts that are not linked by a common 
institutional framework. But only the bind-
ing nature of the dispute settlement mea-
sures will decide how robust the agree-
ments on regulatory standards or data pro-
tection are. 
The fifth and final aspect that will weigh 
on the negotiations is the implementation 
of the protocol on Northern Ireland. As a 
reminder, the biggest political conflict in 
the final phase of the Brexit negotiations 
concerned how to deal with Northern Ire-
land. Unlike Theresa May, Boris Johnson 
has accepted a solution whereby Northern 
Ireland will continue to be bound by EU 
single market rules on goods after the tran-
sition period, whereas any customs duties 
will be due on the importation of goods 
from Great Britain into Northern Ireland if 
the goods are “at risk” of being traded in 
the EU. This compromise, worked out under 
high political and time pressures, must now 
be implemented by 31 December 2020. How-
ever, both sides interpret the obligations 
very differently: Whereas the EU assumes 
the necessity of border controls in the Irish 
Sea, Johnson and his government publicly 
deny this. Whether the EU and the United 
Kingdom find a common interpretation – 
and how well implementation then works 
– will affect mutual trust in the negotia-
tions on future relations. 
Between Competition and 
Partnership 
The analysis shows that the next phase of 
Brexit negotiations are taking place under 
completely different political conditions. In 
the first phase of the negotiations, the EU-
27 appeared united and were able to largely 
dictate their exit conditions to a divided 
Britain. In the second phase of the negotia-
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tions, the major conflicts will no longer be 
carried out in the British Parliament, but 
between Brussels and London. The Brexit 
revolution is nearing completion – in the 
British government, the Brexiteers alone 
now set the tone; strengthened at home, 
Johnson will pursue a confrontational strat-
egy from the outset. There is no evidence of 
restraint due to economic considerations or 
out of regard for Northern Ireland and Scot-
land, each of which prefers a soft Brexit. 
The EU must also critically reflect on its 
political negotiation strategy. Although it 
seems to be again very well prepared for the 
many technical details under the leadership 
of Michel Barnier. Beyond that, however, 
the EU-27 must prepare itself for a phase of 
negotiations that is politically more con-
flict-ridden. When setting priorities and 
balancing interests, it becomes more dif-
ficult to preserve the unity of the 27. Ger-
many, which is set to take over the Presi-
dency of the Council during the most sensi-
tive phase of the Brexit negotiations in the 
second half of 2020, must also contribute to 
this. There will be accusations from Lon-
don, threats to break off talks, and attempts 
to sow divisions between the EU-27. 
A compromise zone is not apparent at 
the beginning of the negotiations. British 
demands for maximum sovereignty are 
being put up against the EU’s claim to set 
regulatory standards in its neighbourhood: 
Even with a clear reduction in the level of 
market access compared to the single mar-
ket, the EU will only allow a far-reaching 
trade agreement with zero tariffs and zero 
quotas for a large economy in its neigh-
bourhood if it includes robust procedures 
for enforcing a level playing field. Added to 
this is the great time pressure of now only 
10 months. It leaves no scope for negotiat-
ing product category by product category, 
as in a traditional trade agreement. This 
insistence on strict red lines on both sides, 
coupled with the confrontational approach 
of the British government, increases the 
chances of a no-trade-deal Brexit. Despite 
the wear and tear effect, the EU must pre-
pare itself again for a failure of the negotia-
tions. 
One way out of this stalemate would be 
to think about the problem of achieving a 
level playing field in reverse. Instead of 
legally obliging the United Kingdom to 
adopt EU standards, contrary to its self-
image as a sovereign state, procedures 
should be developed for dealing with Brit-
ish divergence when it actually happens. 
The starting point would be the common 
goal of a zero tariffs free trade agreement, 
because on day 1 after the transition phase, 
the United Kingdom will still be applying 
the EU standard in its entirety. Instead of 
requiring the United Kingdom to be legally 
bound to EU standards, however, the EU 
could develop a procedure whereby, in the 
event of real British divergence, the Union 
could robustly and proportionately rebuild 
trade barriers to enforce fair competition 
rules. The EU should also prepare such 
trade defence instruments for the event of 
a no-trade-deal Brexit. London would thus 
have the fundamental freedom to deviate 
from EU standards, while the EU would 
have the means to protect the European 
economy in case of doubt. Moreover, the 
difference would be clear between the 
EU/internal market membership and this 
“UK” model with free trade agreements and 
reinsurance against divergence. On this 
basis, negotiators could, even with the high 
time pressure, develop a model that reflects 
the special position of the EU and United 
Kingdom between partnership and com-
petition. 
Dr Nicolai von Ondarza is Deputy Head of the EU / Europe Division. 
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